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| Property
Rights and Property Law Dean Lueck and Thomas J. Miceli |
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| [download paper] [research papers listings] | |
| Abstract | |
| This
chapter examines the economics of property rights and property law. It
shows how the economics of property rights can be used to understand fundamental
features of property law and related extra-legal institutions. The chapter
examines both the rationale for legal doctrine, and the effects of legal
doctrine regarding the exercise, enforcement, and transfer of rights.
It also examines various property rights regimes including open access,
private ownership, common property, and state property. The guiding questions
are: How are property rights established? What explains the variation
in the types of property rights? What governs the use and transfer of
rights? And, how are property rights enforced? In answering these questions
we argue that property rights and property law can be best understood
as a system of societal rules designed to maximize social wealth. They
do this by creating incentives for people to maintain and invest in assets,
which leads to specialization and trade. |
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© 2011 Dept. of Agricultural & Resource Economics, The University of Arizona
Send comments or questions to arecweb@ag.arizona.edu
Last updated September 15, 2004
Document located at http://ag.arizona.edu/arec/pubs/researchpapers/abstract2004-01.html